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On delight: Thoughts for tomorrow  
Claudia Westermann, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University 	
Abstract	The	article	introduces	the	problematics	of	the	classical	two-valued	logic	on	which	western	thought	is	generally	based,	outlining	 that	under	 the	conditions	of	 its	 logical	assumptions	 the	subject	 I	 is	situated	 in	a	world	 that	 it	 cannot	address.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	article	outlines	a	 short	history	of	cybernetics	and	the	shift	 from	first-	 to	second-order	cybernetics.	The	basic	principles	of	Gordon	Pask’s	1976	Conversation	Theory	are	introduced.	It	is	argued	that	this	second-order	theory	grants	agency	to	others	through	a	re-conception	of	living	beings	as	You	logically	transcending	the	I.	The	key	principles	of	Conversation	Theory	are	set	in	relation	to	the	poetic	forms	of	discourse	that	played	a	key	role	in	art	as	well	as	philosophical	thinking	in	China	in	the	past.	Second-order	thinking,	the	article	 argues,	 is	 essentially	 poetic.	 It	 foregoes	 prediction	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 potentiality	 of	encountering	tomorrow’s	delights.			
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Introduction			 The	attitude	of	man	is	twofold,	in	accordance	with	the	twofold	nature	of	the	primary	words	which	he	speaks.	[…]	The	one	primary	word	is	the	combination	I-You.	The	other	primary	word	 is	 the	 combination	 I-It;	wherein,	without	a	 change	 in	 the	primary	word,	one	of	 the	words	He	and	She	can	replace	It.	Hence	the	I	of	man	is	also	twofold.	For	the	I	of	the	primary	word	I-You	is	a	different	I	from	that	of	the	primary	word	I-It.	Primary	words	do	not	signify	things,	but	they	intimate	relations.	(Buber	[1923]	1937:	8)		 [..]	we	must	 seriously	 countenance	 the	 integrity	 and	 individuality	of	 these	perspectives	 -	having	entities,	the	reality	of	speaking	to	them	as	 ‘You’,	and	‘I’,	rather	than	’it’,	or	 ’that’.	A	rigorous,	quantifiable,	yet	subjective,	(insofar	as	’objective’	literally	implies-’it-referenced’),	theory	is	required.	Conversation	Theory	is	an	attempt	to	provide	such	a	vehicle.	It	carries	with	it	novel	methods	of	measurement,	both	sharp	valued	and	fuzzy.		(Pask	1978:	2)	
	In	antique	Greek	philosophy,	which	forms	the	basis	of	western	philosophical	thinking,	the	subject	I	is	set	into	relation	to	the	world	in	which	it	lives	via	mediation	by	a	higher-order	wisdom	or	truth,	an	absolute	objective	being.	Only	absolute	objective	beings	–	typically	referred	to	as	Gods	–	know	what	 and	 how	 the	world	 in	 reality	 is,	 including	what	 and	 how	human	beings	 are.	 It	 is	 only	 via	reference	to	this	higher-order	wisdom	that	I-subjects	can	be	seen	as	in	relation	with	all	the	things	that	they	perceive	in	the	world.	This	becomes	apparent	especially	in	discourses	concerned	in	the	widest	sense	with	aesthetic	themes,	pertaining	to	sense	perception.	The	artist	in	Plato’s	philosophy,	for	example,	depends	on	the	inspiration	transmitted	by	the	muses,	godly	creatures.	Any	reference	to	the	truth	of	the	world	in	art	cannot	be	conceived	in	another	way,	but	as	insufflated	by	higher-order	beings.	Even	 the	act	of	 creation,	 thus	does	not	 lead	 to	 substituting	an	 indirect	by	a	direct	relationship.	The	artist’s	relation	to	the	reality	of	the	work	of	art	is	indirect.		The	 theoretical	 construct	 that	 defines	 being	 in	 the	 world	 as	 dependent	 on	 a	 mediator	consequently	 also	 implicates	 that	 the	 relations	 of	 the	 I-subject	 to	 both	 objects	 and	 other	 living	beings	in	the	world	are	of	equal	value.	The	focus	of	the	mediation	is	on	truth.	The	process	does	not	allow	for	making	a	qualitative	difference	between	relationships	with	either	things	in	the	world	or	
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other	living	beings	in	world.	I	do	not	have	access	to	the	reality	of	objects,	or	the	reality	of	other	living	beings.	 Truth	 can	 be	 recognized	 exclusively	 from	 a	 viewpoint	 that	 is	 extramundane.	 If	 all	relationships	are	of	equal	value,	then	each	encounter	of	the	I-subject,	whether	with	objects	or	other	living	beings,	is	an	encounter	with	an	Other.	This	is	the	basis	for	western	thinking.	It	is	essentially	two-valued	and	consequently	evolves	from	its	antique	variations	–	that	knew	of	some	gaps	at	least	(Westermann	2011)	–	to	a	thinking	that	strictly	separates	between	subject	and	object,	between	true	and	false,	and	body	and	mind.		The	 dualistic	 thinking	 is	 logically	 founded	 on	 the	 theoretical	 construct	 of	 an	 external	mediator	that	allows	only	to	a	limited	extent	for	qualitative	fuzziness.	In	antiquity,	there	is	only	one	truly	defining	relation,	and	it	 is	the	one	to	the	higher-order	being,	which	knows	more	than	I	can	know.	Descartes’	famous	statement	‘Cogito	ergo	sum’	–	I	think	therefore	I	am	(1644)	–	cuts	off	this	one	 defining	 relation,	 and	 it	 is	 in	 so	 far	 consequent	 as	 it	 carries	 forward	 in	 a	 radical	manner	 a	development	 that	 was	 ongoing,	 and	 that	 leads	 from	 a	 thinking	 in	 relations	 to	 a	 thinking	 in	separations.	 With	 this	 gesture	 that	 is	 based	 on	 radical	 doubt,	 Descartes	 sets	 the	 stage	 for	 the	development	of	science,	but	he	also	explicates	a	problem	that	pertains	 to	western	thinking.	 It	 is	generally	referred	to	as	mind-body	problem	and	relates	to	the	obvious	absurdity	of	a	disconnection	between	body	and	mind.		Consequently,	 from	now	 onwards,	 every	 encounter	 of	 the	 I-subject	with	 the	world	 is	 an	encounter	that	is	marked	by	separation.	Clearly,	being	in	a	world	without	relations	is	a	meaningless	being.	The	problematics	that	come	along	with	an	I-subject	that	is	reflected	onto	itself,	and	the	efforts	that	 it	 needs	 to	 reconnect	 it	 with	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 life,	 are	 evidenced	 in	 the	 philosophical	examinations	that	follow	after	Descartes.	The	philosophical	project	of	Gottfried	Wilhelm	Leibniz,	which	makes	us	‘monads’	reflecting	the	universe	([1714]	1999),	is	a	counter-model	to	the	Cartesian	one	 as	 is	 Immanuel	 Kant’s	 transcendental	 project,	 which	 dedicates	 itself	 in	 the	 three	 famous	
Critiques	to	the	possibility	of	epistemology,	and	based	on	this,	of	ethics	and	of	aesthetics	under	the	condition	of	an	I-subject-centred	view	(Kant	[1781–90]	1993).	Nevertheless,	the	two-valuedness	remains	 inscribed	 in	 the	western	model	 of	 thinking,	 and	with	 it	 remains	 an	 I	 that	 needs	 to	 do	without	a	You.	The	technical	advancement	in	the	twentieth	century	carries	along	a	model	of	thought	that	is	based	on	classical	logic.	Its	success	is	confirmation	and	victory	of	the	Cartesian	model.	Since	psychoanalysis	 entered	 western	 thinking	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 the	 I-subject	 might	 be	considered	as	manifold	and	reflective,	but	it	is	still	quite	alone.		
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	 And	in	these	operations	the	person	‘I,’	whether	explicit	or	implicit,	splits	into	a	number	of	different	figures:	into	an	‘I’	who	is	writing	and	an	‘I’	who	is	written,	into	an	empirical	‘I’	who	looks	over	the	shoulder	of	the	‘I’	who	is	writing	and	into	a	mythical	‘I’	who	serves	as	a	model	for	the	‘I’	who	is	written.	The	‘I’	of	the	author	is	dissolved	in	the	writing.	(Calvino	[1967]	1986:	1)		In	 the	 following,	 a	model	 is	 described	 that	developed	 in	dialogue	with	 scientific	methodologies,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 presenting	 a	 counter-model	 to	 the	 two–valued	 thinking.	 It	 heralds	 the	dialogue	between	art	and	technology.		
A	short	history	of	cybernetics	The	history	of	 cybernetics	begins	 in	 the	middle	of	 the	 twentieth	 century	with	 the	 famous	Macy	Conferences.	The	first	Macy	Conference	on	cybernetics	took	place	in	1946,	the	last	and	tenth	in	1953	(Pias	2016).	The	conferences	carry	the	name	of	the	foundation	that	initiated	them	–	the	Josiah	Macy	Jr	Foundation.	To	be	precise,	one	should	add	that	there	was	already	an	earlier	conference	in	the	year	1942	 that	 predates	 the	 above	 mentioned	 series.	 It	 was	 entitled	 Circular	 Causal	 and	 Feedback	
Mechanisms	 in	 Biological	 and	 Social	 Systems	 (Glanville	 2007:	 1180).	 Participation	 in	 this	 first	conference	was	by	invitation	only.	Among	the	invitees	were	key	actors	in	the	later	conference	series,	among	 others,	 Warren	 McCulloch,	 Margaret	 Mead	 and	 Gregory	 Bateson.	 What	 brought	 the	participants	together	was	a	shared	interest	in	new	technologies	and	their	potentialities,	in	systems	science	and	inter-disciplinary	approaches.	The	new	technologies	–	it	was	assumed	–	confronted	us	with	questions	that	could	be	solved	only	through	dialogue	between	various	disciplines.	Consequently,	the	Macy	Conferences	involved	computer	scientists,	anthropologists,	mathematicians,	physicists,	psychologists,	biologists.	The	list	of	famous	names	is	long.	It	was	agreed	that	a	new	conceptual	framework	and	a	new	language	was	required.	It	was	further	agreed	that	the	dialogue	needed	to	be	conducted	from	a	systemic	viewpoint	to	allow	communication	first	of	all,	and	second,	that	feedback	and	circularity	were	crucial	 in	the	engagement	 with	 any	 system,	 including	 systems	 extending	 the	 biological	 and	 social	 ones	 by	technical	means.	
 
 
 
5 
5 
It	is	well	known	that	the	invention	of	the	computer	led	to	euphoria,	at	least	on	the	side	of	science.	The	world	was	seen	rushing	towards	a	new	era,	in	which	humanity	would	enter	a	new	stage	of	development.	This	does	not	mean	that	 there	were	no	sceptics,	but	 that	enormous	amounts	of	money	were	given	to	research	projects	that	convincingly	promised	to	substitute	human	beings	by	machines	within	a	manageable	amount	of	 time.	Cybernetics	profited	 from	 this	disposition	at	 its	birth,	but	the	combination	of	systemic	approach	and	inter-disciplinary	composition	of	the	partners	in	dialogue	prevented	blind	euphoria.	Eventually,	a	transition	was	initiated	from	a	cybernetics	of	first	order,	which	was	basically	in	line	with	the	framework	of	the	scientific	method,	to	a	cybernetics	of	second	order,	which	can	be	aligned	with	the	scientific	method	only	to	a	limited	extent	as	it	goes	beyond	its	very	methodology.	It	is	a	meta	enquiry	that	allows	us	to	critically	reflect	on	the	processes	of	 first-order	 enquiry	 as	 they	 create	 understandings	 in	 and	 of	 the	world,	 including	 science	 (cp.	Westermann	forthcoming).	The	 cybernetics	 of	 second	 order	 differentiate	 themselves	 from	 the	 cybernetics	 of	 first	 order	essentially	by	including	the	observer	as	observant	into	the	observation.	The	thought	that	is	at	the	basis	of	this	development,	and	that	initiates	an	extension	of	the	system,	can	be	traced	back	to	the	philosophy	of	ancient	Greece	–	as	mentioned	above,	namely	that	we	can	never	be	sure	that	what	we	observe	is	aligned	with	the	reality	of	the	world.	If	we	cannot	be	sure	of	this,	the	investigation	must	include	the	act	of	observing	as	well.	It	should	be	noted	that	science	is	not	completely	unconscious	of	the	problematics	of	an	excluded	observer	that	constitutes	a	first-order	enquiry,	but	it	assumes	that	access	to	reality	is	generally	possible	and	contingent	only	on	us	perfecting	our	way	of	observing.	Science	has	heralded	its	triumphal	course	by	circumventing	the	problem	of	the	excluded	observer	–	one	could	say	–	quite	elegantly.	The	scientific	method	postulates	the	possibility	of	falsification.	Each	scientific	proof	must	be	done	in	such	a	way	that	it	can	be	either	confirmed	or	falsified.	This	means	elegant	circumvention	of	the	core	problem,	in	so	far	as	one	can	assume	valid	results,	so	long	as	 the	 results	have	not	been	 falsified.	What	 is	 rarely	made	explicit	 is	 that	 even	 in	 the	best	 case	scenario	scientific	results	are	just	probable.	They	are	sufficiently	probable	to	facilitate	the	raison	d'être	of	science,	predicting	future	processes.	Science,	for	example,	has	enabled	us	to	explore	the	moon	(cp.	Glanville	2007:	176).	Scientific	method	creates	security.	It	is	a	security	that	is	also	merely	probable.		The	basic	problem	 is	a	philosophical	one.	 It	 is	not	said	 that	an	observation	 that	does	not	reflect	 the	act	of	observing	can	ever	state	any	proposition	 that	corresponds	 to	 the	reality	of	 the	
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world.	In	any	case,	it	will	never	be	possible	to	prove	it.	A	scientific	proposition	cannot	be	considered	real	even	if	it	has	not	been	possible	to	falsify	it	over	hundreds	of	years.	It	is	still	possible	that	we	have	overlooked	something,	as	plausible	as	our	explanations	may	look	like	for	hundreds	of	years	–	e.g.,	the	flat	earth	theory.		 The	development	of	second-order	cybernetics	 is	consistent	with	scientific	 insights,	which	suggest	that	there	is	no	reason	to	assume	that	human	beings	are	capable	of	perceiving	their	external	environment	 in	 a	 stable	manner	 (cp.	 Foerster	 [1973]	 2003).	 A	method	 that	 promises	 to	make	reliable	predictions	on	the	basis	of	unreliable	observation	constitutes	an	obvious	contradiction.	It	is	this	contradiction	that	is	addressed	in	second-order	cybernetics	by	including	the	act	of	observing	into	the	examination.	However,	the	system	that	we	deal	with	in	this	case	is	not	anymore	based	on	classical	logic.	It	is	an	extended	system	that	cannot	be	conceived	on	the	basis	of	classical	two-valued	logic.		 For	 the	 development	 of	 cybernetics	 from	 first	 to	 second	 order,	 the	 scientist	 Heinz	 von	Foerster	plays	an	important	role.	With	the	foundation	of	the	Biological	Computer	Laboratory	(BCL)	at	the	University	of	Illinois	in	1958,	an	important	institution	was	founded	that	allowed	the	further	pursuit	 of	 the	 dialogues	 that	 had	 been	 initiated	 by	 the	Macy	 Conferences.	 It	 is	 not	 insignificant	within	this	context	that	Heinz	von	Foerster	was	not	only	an	extraordinary	physicist,	but	that	he	also	disposed	of	an	extensive	education	in	philosophy.	Also	for	this	reason,	Gotthard	Guenther	obtained	a	position	at	the	BCL	in	1960.	As	a	philosopher	specializing	on	German	idealism	and	Hegel’s	thought,	Guenther	did	not	have	the	profile	that	would	normally	allow	for	obtaining	a	position	at	an	institution	that	is	concerned	with	the	development	of	computers.	Yet,	Gotthard	Guenther	was	of	interest	to	von	Foerster	for	a	number	of	reasons.	For	example,	already	in	1953,	he	had	published	an	essay	with	the	title	‘Can	mechanical	brains	have	consciousness?’	in	which	he	argued	that	consciousness	–	not	self-consciousness	–	could,	at	least	theoretically,	be	represented	as	a	mechanical	process,	yet	not	on	the	basis	of	classical	two-valued	logic	(Guenther	1953).	As	an	anecdote	one	could	add	at	this	point	that	the	 above-mentioned	 essay	 was	 published	 not	 in	 a	 scientific	 journal	 but	 in	 a	 science	 fiction	magazine.	 Gotthard	 Guenther,	 already	 in	 the	 above-mentioned	 text	 from	 1953,	 referred	 to	consciousness	as	a	reflection	of	second	order.	Yet,	it	was	not	until	1967	that	the	new	cybernetics	was	officially	referred	to	as	second-order	cybernetics.	At	the	same	time	in	the	United	Kingdom,	an	important	group	of	scientists	also	worked	on	the	development	of	cybernetics.	The	so-called	Ratio	Club	met	in	the	years	1949	to	1958	and	included	
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many	notable	members	and	guests,	e.g.,	Ross	Ashby	and	Alan	Turing	(Husbands	and	Holland	2008).	While	the	group	communicated	with	the	cyberneticians	in	the	United	States,	the	development	of	cybernetics	in	the	United	Kingdom	can	nevertheless	be	considered	a	distinct	development.	Notably,	largely	thanks	to	UK	scientist	Gordon	Pask,	second-order	cybernetics	was	set	into	relation	with	art	and	design.			
Western	and	eastern	perspectives	Until	 the	 introduction	of	 the	western	perspective	 in	 the	eighteenth	century,	 the	development	of	philosophy,	aesthetic	thought	and	art	in	China	proceeded	largely	detached	from	western	influences.	Western	perspective,	in	which	vanishing	lines	end	in	precisely	constructed	vanishing	points,	and	by	which	things	that	are	far	are	depicted	smaller	than	those	that	are	close,	is	in	line	with	the	above-mentioned	 dualistic	 way	 of	 thinking.	 The	 British	 artist	 David	 Hockney	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	development	 of	 the	 western	 perspective	 had	 a	 great	 impact	 also	 because	 it	 led	 to	 a	 military	advantage	(Hockney	and	Haas	1988).	Even	though	precisely	constructed	perspectives	appear	to	no	longer	play	an	important	role	in	contemporary	western	art,	the	perspective	way	of	seeing	could	be	seen	as	making	the	basic	measure	of	western	views.	It	is	an	accepted	and	dominant	way	of	depicting	at	least	in	the	applied	disciplines	such	as	Architecture	and	Design.	One	could	argue	that	the	West	is	governed	by	a	monocular	 centrism	 that	 essentially	 corresponds	 to	 a	 logo	 centrism	and	 its	 two-valued	logic.	When	western	perspective	entered	China,	the	term	for	perspective	in	Chinese	changed	from	Far	Near	(yuǎn	jìn)	to	Through	View	(tòu	shì).	This	indicates	a	shift	that	is	not	simply	technical.	It	is	a	conceptual	shift.	Following	the	‘Great	commentary’	(300	BC)	to	the	Book	of	Changes,	we	may	form	an	idea	of	what	the	Far	Near	Method	encompassed.	In	Chapter	2,	 in	a	translation	by	James	Legge,	the	Commentary	states:		 Anciently,	when	Bao-xi	had	come	to	the	rule	of	all	under	heaven,	looking	up,	he	contemplated	the	brilliant	forms	exhibited	in	the	sky,	and	looking	down	he	surveyed	the	patterns	shown	on	the	earth.	He	contemplated	the	ornamental	appearances	of	birds	and	beasts	and	the	(different)	suitabilities	of	the	soil.	Near	[jìn]	at	hand,	in	his	own	person,	he	found	things	for	consideration,	and	the	same	at	a	distance	[yuǎn],	in	things	in	general.	On	this	he	devised	the	eight	trigrams,	to	show	fully	the	attributes	of	the	spirit-like	and	intelligent	(operations	working	secretly),	and	to	classify	the	qualities	of	the	myriads	of	things.	(Anon.	~300BC)	
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	While	western	painting	is	typically	oriented	towards	fixed	ideals	and	absolutes,	Chinese	traditional	painting	attempts	 to	emphasize	 the	vitality	of	nature,	 vagueness	and	 change.	When	western	art	emphasized	 the	 genius	 author	 as	 a	mediator	 to	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	world,	 Chinese	 art	 de-emphasized	the	presence	of	an	author	as	mediator	(Han	[2011]	2017).	It	instead	emphasized	the	function	of	 the	artwork	as	an	 interface	between	 the	viewer	and	 the	world.	The	 famous	Chinese	painting	 manual	 Mustard	 Seed	 Garden	 Manual	 of	 Painting	 (Sze	 1977),	 which	 was	 originally	published	in	China	between	1679	and	1701,	states,		 Figures	should,	in	fact,	be	depicted	in	such	a	way	that	people	looking	at	a	painting	wish	they	could	change	places	with	them.	Otherwise	the	mountain	is	just	a	mountain,	the	figures	mere	figures,	 placed	by	 chance	near	 each	other	 and	with	no	 apparent	 connection;	 and	 the	whole	painting	lacks	vitality.	(Sze	1977:220)		Clearly,	the	complexity	of	relations	that	we	find	described	in	the	‘Great	commentary’	to	the	Book	of	
Changes	found	representation	–	but	not	in	the	western	sense	–	in	Chinese	art,	where	we	also	find	a	fluidity	of	concepts	that	is	due	to	thinking	relations	in	the	context	of	life	as	in	movement	(cp.	Pohl	2006).	This	thinking	is	poetic	and	it	has	persisted	in	the	East	for	far	longer	than	in	the	West.	While	western	philosophers	struggled	with	dis-evaluating	the	Cartesian	model	of	thinking,	philosophy	in	China	had	focused	over	hundreds,	indeed	thousands	of	years,	on	thinking	relations	and	not	separations.	There	was	a	counter-model	of	thinking	in	China.		Yet,	while	noticed	in	the	West,	it	was	also	rejected	as	irrelevant.	Influential	judgements	about	Chinese	thinking	as	unphilosophical	in	principle,	and	for	this	reason	not	interesting	for	a	closer	examination,	are	to	be	found,	for	example,	with	Hegel.	Earnest	attempts	to	study	Chinese	thought	were	rare.	The	German	philosopher	Gottfried	Wilhelm	Leibniz,	however,	notably	named	by	Norbert	Wiener	 the	 father	of	 cybernetics	 (Wiener	1961:	12),	discovered	similarities	between	his	philosophy	and	the	Confucian	tradition,	as	well	as	between	 his	 binary	 number	 system	 and	 the	 Book	 of	 Changes’	 system	 explicated	 in	 hexagrams	(Leibniz	2006).	Further	research	needs	to	be	done	to	clarify	to	what	extent	Leibniz’	understanding	of	 Chinese	 thought	might	 have	 been	 distorted,	 as	 it	 was	 based	 solely	 on	 descriptions	 by	 Jesuit	missionaries	and	thus	subjected	to	double	interpretation.	
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	 After	Leibniz,	attempts	to	examine	Chinese	thinking	can	be	found	in	the	twentieth	century,	but	 they	are	more	common	in	avant-garde	art	 than	 in	 theory	or	philosophy.	An	exception	 is	 the	Austrian-born	Jewish	philosopher	Martin	Buber	who	became	well	known	with	the	publication	of	a	book	that	is	translated	to	English	in	1937	as	‘I	and	Thou’	(Buber	[1923]	1995;	[1923]	1937).	The	English	translation	of	the	book’s	title	is	to	some	extent	misleading	as	‘Thou’	appears	to	relate	to	a	distant	God.	‘I	and	You’	would	better	emphasize	what	was	of	key	importance	to	Buber,	namely	that	other	living	beings	are	considered	to	be	directly	related	to	a	living	I,	and	can	be	addressed.		Martin	Buber	introduces	in	the	book	a	qualitative	difference	for	the	relationships	of	the	I-subject	to	the	objects	in	the	world	on	the	one	hand,	and	to	the	living	beings	in	the	world	on	the	other	hand.	Yet,	what	an	object	is,	is	not	always	clear.	A	tree,	for	example,	could	be	both	You	and	It.	There	is	 a	 complexity	 and	 fluidity	 in	 Buber’s	 thought	 that	 is	 rare	 for	 western	 thinking.	 It	 could	 be	considered	important	that	Buber	had	–	a	long	time	before	‘I	and	You’	was	published	–	extensively	studied	both	Laozi	and	Zhuangzi.	A	translation	of	Zhuangzi	was	published	in	1910,	a	translation	of	Chinese	 folk	tales	 in	1911.	A	commentary	on	Laozi’s	Daodejing	was	made	 in	1924	but	remained	unpublished	(Herman	1996).		Gordon	 Pask,	 known	 for	 having	 contributed	Conversation	 Theory	 to	 the	 development	 of	 second	order	cybernetics	and	for	linking	second	order	thinking	to	art	and	design,	refers	directly	to	Buber	in	his	publications	at	a	number	of	occasions	(1978).	Pask	also	mentions	the	influence	of	Gotthard	Guenther,	who	had	mapped	the	I–You	relationship	in	logic	–	notably	by	pointing	out	that	You	can	only	be	conceived	in	second	order	logic	(Guenther	[1957]	1991:	74–83).		There	appears	to	be	sufficient	congruence	between	second-order	cybernetics	and	traditional	Chinese	 thought	 to	 assume	 that	 second	 order	 thinking	 has	 excellent	 potential	 to	 initiate	 a	 new	dialogue	between	the	East	and	the	West.			
On	delight	The	above-mentioned	passages	might	have	 suggested	 that	 second	order	methodologies,	 such	as	developed	by	Gordon	Pask	in	Conversation	Theory	and	in	the	extended	Interactions	of	Actors	Theory,	could	be	based	on	one	basic	shift	 in	assumptions.	 It	might	be	better	to	consider	that	there	are	a	number	of	shifts	in	thought	that	relate	to	each	other.	 	They	are	all	also,	if	not	equally,	important.	
Conversation	Theory	assumes	that	we	encounter	other	living	beings	in	the	world.	They	transcend	as	You	the	I-subject	and	cannot	be	conceived	with	the	assistance	of	a	two-valued	classical	logic.	Only	
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in	this	way	other	living	beings	can	be	conceived	as	having	agency.	Conversation	in	this	context	is	the	most	basic	and	common	activity	of	curious	beings	seeking	to	learn.		According	 to	 Pask,	 the	 experiences	 humans	 seek	 are	 those	 that	 transcend	 known	experiences	and	can	be	described	as	‘aesthetically	potent’	(1970).	Aesthetis	typically	emphasizes	that	encounters	with	art	lead	to	new	experiences	that	are	not	to	be	conceived	of	as	finite.		Art,	so	says	Immanuel	Kant,	for	example,	‘has	the	effect	of	advancing	the	culture	of	the	mental	powers	in	the	 interests	 of	 social	 communication’	 [Kant	 [1790]	 2007:	 306],	 and	 this	 is	 what	 makes	 the	encounter	pleasurable	in	the	widest	sense.	This	pleasure	is	a	higher	form	of	learning.	Pask	appears	to	have	something	similar	 in	mind	when	he	states	that	human	beings	seek	what	 is	 ‘aesthetically	potent’.	 What	 humans	 seek	 is	 delight.	 What	 we	 seek	 is	 delight.	 Every	 conversation	 holds	 the	potential	of	becoming	such	an	aesthetic	experience	of	delight,	but	it	is	not	predictable.		The	future	is	open.		Because	Conversation	Theory	addresses	the	open	future	of	possible	delight	it	also	provides	a	suitable	theory	for	all	the	activities	that	engage	in	making	and	creating	–	these	activities	of	which	we	know	that	they	are	radically	oriented	towards	a	future	as	an	unknown,	art	and	design.	Second-order	thinking	is	essentially	poetic,	and	in	this	way	it	can	be	set	into	relation	to	the	above-mentioned	 tradition	 in	 Chinese	 thought	 and	 art.	 Both	 forego	 prediction	 to	 embrace	 the	potentiality	of	tomorrow’s	delights.		
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